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Abstract 
 
Localities will provide inefficient levels of public amenities in the presence of spillovers.  Vision 
Iowa provided partial state funding to communities to build tourist attractions, a potential 
solution to local underprovision of public goods.  A 10% increase in state funds increased county 
taxable retail sales by 0.1%.  The State’s return from resulting sales tax revenue averaged 11.8%.  
Local communities paid more and received less tax, and so their return was much smaller at 
1.2%.  Neighboring community sales also increased.  The positive spillovers to neighbors and 
the state suggest that local communities will undersupply public amenities without state 
subsidies. 
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If you build it, will they come?:  Fiscal federalism, local provision of public tourist 
amenities, and the Vision Iowa Fund 
 
Daddy, we don't have to sell the farm.  People will come…from all over. 
They'll just decide to take a vacation, see?  And they'll come to lowa City. 
They'll think it's really boring.  So they'll want to pay us. 
Like buying a ticket.   
It will be just like when they were kids, a long time ago. 
Karin Kinsella to her father Ray, Field of Dreams (1989) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Research documenting a variety of positive effects of amenities in fostering economic 
growth has sparked a burgeoning interest in amenity-led rural development efforts (Power, 
2006).  Most directly, amenities may spur tourism which supports increased retail expenditures, 
employment and new firm entry.  They may also draw new residents and new workers to the area 
(Deller et al. 2001; McGranahan 1999; Nord and Cromertie 1997).  
While much of the research focus has been on natural amenities -- pleasant climates, 
oceans, lakes, and other beautiful landscapes-- more recent studies recognize the importance of 
man-made features as well.  Built amenities such as recreation facilities can complement natural 
ones, resulting in stronger growth impacts than would occur from the natural ones alone (Olfert 
and Partridge, 2010).  Cultural amenities such as museums or music venues contribute to local 
quality of life and encourage in-migration (Clark 2003; Florida 2002; Partridge, et al. 2008; 
Wojan, Lambert and McGranahan 2007).   
A long-standing issue in public economics is whether local communities will provide the 
optimal level of such public built amenities.  If benefits from these local public goods spillover 
to nonresidents (Gordon, 1983), or if funding for the amenity is generated by distortionary local 
taxes (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986), the local government will under-invest in local public 
goods relative to the optimal level.  One way to increase the supply of local public goods is for 
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higher levels of government to provide matching grants. When appropriately designed, these 
matching grants can induce local governments to incorporate the interjurisdictional spillover 
benefits in their decision making, lessening the costs arising from a lack of coordination among 
communities, while preserving local decision-making authority (Gordon 1983; Oates 1999; 
Oates 2005).   
Of course, there is no guarantee that such projects actually pay off.  Many local projects 
may not be public goods.  Others may crowd out sales in neighboring localities or not generate 
sufficient new revenue to justify their expense.  Numerous studies have examined the public 
return to investments in expensive local amenities such as sports facilities, cultural centers and 
convention centers.  Most convention centers have failed to generate expected revenues 
(Sanders, 2002).  The main beneficiaries from professional sports arenas have been players and 
owners (Swindell and Rosentraub, 1998; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2002).  Gains from ticket sales 
often come at the expense of other entertainment venues, limiting the net return to these projects.  
However, not all large public amenity investments have been losers.  Nelson (2001) found larger 
external benefits when new sports venues are placed in blighted areas.  Rosentraub (2009) argues 
that nonpecuniary benefits from civic pride or from an enhanced reputation for entertainment can 
justify the investment, even when the pecuniary returns are lacking. 
These studies have focused on large cities with many entertainment options to a new 
sports venue, convention site or performing arts center.  In those markets, it is likely that 
increased business in the new venue will come at the expense of competing entertainment 
options.  Smaller towns may not have as many substitutes for the new venue.  Consistent with 
that presumption, there is more evidence of positive pecuniary returns to minor league sports 
(Agha, 2013) and collegiate athletics (Lentz and Laband, 2009).  With few competing 
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entertainment options, the spillover benefits to the retail and hospitality industries will be more 
apparent.  Similarly, in blighted areas of cities, there will be few competing entertainment 
options whose sales would be harmed by the new venue. 
This study examines whether an Iowa state program that offered partial investment in 
local public cultural, recreational and entertainment amenities paid off for the state.  In 2001, 
Iowa instituted Vision Iowa, a program that provided partial funding to Iowa communities for a 
wide variety of projects ranging from relatively small aquatic centers, park improvements and 
libraries to large convention centers and performance and sports arenas. Over eight years, the 
$228 million public investment by Vision Iowa helped spur almost $2 billion in new public 
facilities and improvements in 91 of the 99 counties in Iowa.   
We find that the Vision Iowa program significantly raised taxable sales relative to past 
county-specific trend growth in sales in the counties that built new public amenities.  The State 
of Iowa made an 11.8% net return per year on their investment in the form of a 5% sales tax on 
every additional dollar of sales generated.  Neighboring counties also experienced more modest 
but statistically significant growth in taxable sales relative to trend.  Therefore, we find two ways 
that benefits from the local amenities spilled over to other jurisdictions, implying that local 
governments would have undersupplied these built amenities without the state subsidy.  The 
communities that hosted the new amenities had a much more modest 1.2% per year net return on 
their investments in the form of induced increase in local sales taxes, but they also received the 
utility from having the new amenities in town. 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Tiebout (1956) argued that variation in the provision of local public goods and tax rates 
allowed people to “vote with their feet.” Mobile residents choose to live in the community that 
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best meets their willingness to pay for and utility from government services.  An implication is 
that communities can compete for residents by providing a mix of publicly funded amenities that 
is particularly attractive to populations it wishes to attract.   These public goods will raise the 
value of inelastically supplied local land as migrants attracted by the amenities bid up land 
values1.  Because property tax receipts rise with rising land values, the property tax can be 
viewed as a residential user fee on efficiently provided local public goods (Hamilton, 1975, 
1976).  In fact, Glaeser (1996) contends that it is the opportunity to raise local taxes that provides 
an incentive for local governments to provide the amenities that local residents desire.   
Other researchers have argued that local governments are unlikely to provide the efficient 
level of local public goods.  Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Zodrow (2006) showed that 
because property taxes increase the cost of private capital, investors will shift their capital 
investments toward low tax jurisdictions.  Knowing that, local governments will hold back on the 
provision of public services relative to the level they would provide if they had access to a 
revenue source that did not distort the cost of capital.  Gordon (1983) proposed that if local 
public goods generate positive spillovers to other jurisdictions, then local public good provision 
will be inefficient.   For example, a local library can have positive spillovers to nonresidents who 
use the library but do not pay to support it, causing a local government to underinvest in its 
library.2   
Gordon (1983) and Oates (1999, 2005) argue that fiscal federalism offers a mechanism to 
induce the optimal level of public goods provision in the presence of these capital price 
distortions and positive spillovers.  State or federal matching grants can induce additional 
                                                            
1 As noted by Bewley (1981), the conditions necessary to generate the Tiebout result are unlikely to hold in reality. 
2 There could be overprovision of local library services as well. Zax (1988) argues that if there are returns to scale in 
library provision, jurisdictions may each provide a library at less than efficient scale and higher cost rather than 
having one jurisdiction specialize in library provision.   
6 
 
investment in local public goods when local governments have an incentive to underinvest.   The 
theory of fiscal federalism has been put in practice in numerous settings: Medicare, welfare 
reform, school finance, job training, public transit, disaster relief, and public housing.  The 
rationale for these multilevel funding methods presumes positive spillover benefits from public 
goods, an assumption that holds broadly for public goods (Pereira and Roca-Sagalés, 2003; 
Pinto, 1997).3   
3. THE VISION IOWA PROGRAM 
 In 2001, the State of Iowa instituted Vision Iowa, a program aimed to enhance local 
recreational, cultural, educational, or entertainment attractions available to the general public.  
Iowa communities could apply for state funding for a wide variety of projects.  The program was 
funded by taxes imposed on casinos.4  Vision Iowa only provided partial funding for the projects, 
averaging 20% of the total cost.  The balance had to be raised by the local government or 
through grants and charitable donations.  This infusion of central funding to induce local effort is 
the essence of the fiscal federalism model.  
 This study examines whether Vision Iowa actually succeeded in generating economic 
benefits that justified its costs and whether any benefits were captured by the state or local level 
of government5.  It also investigates whether investments in one locality generated positive or 
negative spillovers in neighboring communities.  Iowa is a good laboratory for evaluating such 
policies because the state is divided into 99 counties of roughly equal size, few of which have 
                                                            
3 Boarnet (1998), Holl (2004), Shirley and Winston (2004) and Cohen and Morrison Paul (2007) present the 
alternate case in which centralized highway infrastructure investments cause negative spillovers.  Local road 
improvements draw economic activity away from areas that do not receive the benefit of federal highway spending.   
4  Casinos first opened in Iowa as river boats in 1990 and as fixed locations in 1992.  Earlier in 1985, the State had 
allowed the opening of dog racing and in 1989, horse racing.  There is no apparent link between Casinos and Vision 
Iowa beyond serving as a source of revenue. 
5 Clearly the state might have used the revenues generated from Casino taxes in other ways.  Since we cannot 
observe what other uses the State considered for these funds, we cannot determine if the Vision Iowa program was 
the best use of funds, but only whether or not the Vision Iowa program was a decent use of these monies.  
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naturally occurring amenities that might complicate the identification of any returns to man-
made amenities.  
Funded projects were selected by a Vision Iowa Board charged with evaluating projects 
on their potential to improve a community’s ability to attract new residents through improved 
quality of life, ability to attract visitors through improved attractions, or ability to generate an 
economic impact.  Between 2001 and 2008, the $228 million public investment by Vision Iowa 
helped spur almost $2 billion in new public facilities and improvements through 393 projects in 
91 of Iowa’s 99 counties. Table 1 shows the distribution of projects and funding from the 
program.  Over three-quarters of the projects were placed in towns with fewer than 10,000 
residents, and only 13% were located in towns with populations over 50,000.  Thirty-four 
percent of the projects and 33% of the allocated funds were assigned to cultural amenities (e.g., 
museums, art centers, libraries).  Investments in recreational and outdoor amenities (e.g. aquatic 
centers, walking/hiking trails, fairground improvements, sports complexes etc.) represented 56% 
of all projects but just 26% of all funds, and so recreational amenities tended to be smaller on 
average.   In contrast, entertainment amenities (e.g. theaters, opera houses,  accounted for 10% of 
the projects but 42% of all funds, so entertainment projects were much larger than average. 
The state’s cumulative investment in local amenities reached $75 per capita by 2008 or 
about $2.3 million per county.  The local counties’ matching expenditures averaged around $9.6 
million for a cumulative average of $11.9 million expended on local projects per county.  
Because projects were implemented in most counties, the average amount spent on projects in 
neighboring counties per capita swamps the amount in county, averaging $116 million in 
amenities in the surrounding communities.  After 2008, the program was sharply diminished in 
size, funding only a handful of projects thereafter.  
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Although not by deliberate design, the Vision Iowa project offers an opportunity to 
examine whether state grants designed to induce new local public amenities actually result in a 
more efficient provision of public services.  Efficiency is enhanced if we can demonstrate 
positive spillovers from these local projects that go to nonresidents because it suggests that in the 
absence of state infusion, local communities would have underinvested in the amenity.  In the 
case of the types of tourism related projects funded by the Vision Iowa program, the most 
plausible source of a positive spillover is an increase in revenue from taxable retail sales that go 
to jurisdictions other than the local area receiving the new amenity6.  Clear evidence of a positive 
spillover exists if increased tourism raises sales not just in the own community, but in 
neighboring communities as well7.  In addition, the State of Iowa benefits as it gets 5 of every 7 
cent tax imposed per dollar of induced increase in taxable retail sales.  However, if the 
investment in one county lowers taxable retail sales in neighboring communities, then there are 
negative spillover effects from the Vision Iowa projects.  If true, the state grants for local 
provision of public amenities will cause overproduction of public goods which will harm the 
state as a whole.   
  
                                                            
6 An alternative would be to examine the impact of these new local public amenities on housing values or rents, 
using an hedonics model, if data were available. 
7 For example, positive spillovers would occur if visitors to the new amenity made purchases in border counties as 
well, for example, purchasing gasoline, eating out, or shopping in neighboring communities.   
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4. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 Let real taxable sales in county i at time t be represented by Sit.  We assume that in the 
absence of any policy shocks, real sales are defined by  
(1) lnሺ ௜ܵ௧ሻ ൌ 	ߙ଴௜ ൅ ߙଵ௜ݐ ൅ ߙଶ௜ݐଶ ൅ ߙெܯ௧ ൅	ߝ௜௧. 
Each county i has unique fixed attributes that define its base level of sales, ߙ଴௜.  The county’s 
resource bases in land, labor and capital define its productive capacity which establishes its base 
consumption level.  Such resources would include natural amenities, access to navigable waters, 
long-standing public infrastructure such as highway or rail access, and the presence of higher 
education institutions.  We estimate the county-specific fixed effects using only the sales before 
the Vision Iowa program began to avoid adding in the impact of the built amenities into the fixed 
effect.   
 Each county also has a unique trend growth rate of ߙଵ௜ per year.  We allow this trend to 
grow or diminish over time with a quadratic term in time.  Finally, state-wide business cycles 
indexed by ܯ௧	raise or lower sales across all counties.  These county-specific fixed effects and 
trends plus the state-wide cyclical variable explain over 98% of the variance in the dependent 
variables we use to measure county output.  The error term ߝ௜௧ representing less than 2% of the 
remaining variation contains remaining factors that affect county sales that are uncorrelated with 
the factors included in (1). 
 A county’s real sales process shifts when exposed to a local public amenity, Ait , 
provided of course that the amenity attracts additional productive resources.  These may be 
additional visitors that create additional demand for local retailers or the amenity may 
complement existing resources in the county, raising productive efficiency.  In the Vision Iowa 
program, these amenities are funded in part by the state and in part by local tax payers.  The 
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impacts of the two funding sources on taxable sales would not be the same in general because the 
state subsidy comes without the need for local taxes while the local expenditures require 
commitment of local resources equal to the value of the amenity.  The local tax obligation may 
lower taxable purchases by local tax payers. 
 Even as the home county i is deciding whether to invest in new amenities, neighboring 
counties may also be introducing man-made amenities, Nit . These amenities may increase or 
decrease sales in the home county.  If such amenities substitute for one another, local sales will 
decrease in the presence of competing amenities elsewhere.  If such amenities complement each 
other, the opposite will occur. These policy shocks are part of the error process in (1).  We 
assume they take the form ߝ௜௧ ൌ ln൫ܣ௜௧ఊಲ൯ ൅ ln൫ ௜ܰ௧ఊಿ൯ ൅ ߱௜௧.		Substituting into (1), we have  
(2)  lnሺ ௜ܵ௧ሻ ൌ 	ߙ଴௜ ൅ ߙଵ௜ݐ ൅ ߙଶ௜ݐଶ ൅ ߙெܯ௧ ൅ ߛ஺ lnሺܣ௜௧ሻ ൅ ߛே lnሺ ௜ܰ௧ሻ ൅	߱௜௧. 
 The term ߱௜௧ is an i.i.d error process.  The sign and significance of ߛ஺ and ߛே will 
reveal whether local and area amenities affect local taxable sales and whether neighboring 
amenities are substitutes or complements.   
 To operationalize (2), we need to specify the functional form for Ait and Nit .  Note that 
these amenities were introduced first in 2000, and so we set them equal to 1 before 2000 and for 
each year thereafter until the first Vision Iowa dollar is spent in the county.  We specify the 
quantity of local public amenities per person as  
(3A) ܣ௜௧ ൌ 	 ௜ܸ௧ఉೇܮ௜௧ఉಽ,				ݐ ൒ 2000               
             = 1, t < 2000.     
where Vit  is the cumulative infusion of the state’s provision of real Vision Iowa funds into the 
local county since 2000 and Lit is the cumulative real per capita local expenditures on these 
projects since 2000.  If the production of local amenities uses resources efficiently, then ߚ௏ ൐ 0 
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and ߚ௅ ൐ 0.  These dollar amounts are in per capita terms, implying that a dollar of public good 
will have a smaller sales spillover effect in a metropolitan area than in a small town.  The 
rationale is that cultural, entertainment and recreational amenities face congestion costs and must 
be scaled up in more populated areas.  
 We model neighboring amenities similarly as  
(3B) ௜ܰ௧ ൌ 	 ௟ܸ೔௧ఏೇܮ௟೔௧ఏಽ ,			ݐ ൒ 2000     
               = 1, t < 2000.                  
௟ܸ೔௧ is the cumulative Vision Iowa investment in all contiguous counties to i.  The contiguous 
county’s local real per capita cumulative investments in these projects is given by ܮ௟೔௧.  As 
before, if these investments have positive spillovers, then ߠ௏ ൐ 0 and ߠ௅ ൐ 0.  However, if they 
compete with home county sales, they will have negative signs.8   
 Inserting (3A) and (3B) into Equation (2), we have 
(4)   ݈݊ሺ ௜ܵ௧ሻ ൌ 	ߙ଴௜ ൅ ߙଵ௜ݐ ൅ ߙଶ௜ݐଶ ൅ ߙெܯ௧ ൅ ߛ஺ߚ௏ lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ ൅ ߛ஺ߚ௅ lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ ൅ 
   ߛேߠ௏ ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ ൅ ߛேߠ௅ ln൫ܮ௟೔௧൯ ൅	߱௜௧;  
the empirical specification we use to test the impact of the Vision Iowa program.  Note that the 
coefficients on the dollars spent on local amenities will be the product of two effects: the 
productivity of the dollars in generating a quality public amenity and the impact of the amenity 
on sales.  Under the maintained hypothesis that these dollars are used efficiently, the signs on 
                                                            
8 The use of neighboring investments to test for spillover effects is a common strategy when impacts may cross 
political boundaries.  Sandler and Hartley (2001) present a theoretical discussion and apply it to whether defense 
expenditures by other allies lower local country defense expenditures in the NATO alliance.  Other examples of 
spillover tests  include Khan et al (2001) who tested whether job growth one or two counties distant added to or 
detracted from local population growth; and Khanna et al (1994) who tested whether agricultural research in 
neighboring states increased or decreased local state support for its agricultural experiment station. 
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these compound coefficients will still reveal whether the own county and neighboring county 
amenities raise or lower local sales. 
 We use several alternative measures of the dependent variable.  In addition to taxable 
retail sales, we also specify taxable sales in sectors that should atypically benefit from increased 
tourism such as those in eating and drinking establishments.  Further, we have information on the 
total number of firms and on the number of eating and drinking establishments which we use as 
alternative outcome measures. 
5.  CONDITIONAL IMPACT EVALUATION  
 
 Many evaluations attempt to derive unconditional estimates of the impact of a policy 
using randomized experiments.  That type of analysis is inconsistent with a policy such as the 
Vision Iowa program.  A local area will not adopt a randomly selected public project; that would 
be inconsistent with rational administration of their scarce public dollars.  Similarly the State 
would not randomly assign scarce resources to pay a portion of the costs of these programs.  
Nonrandom selection of projects and their placement is a key element of the fiscal federalist 
approach.  Consequently, our estimated impacts are conditional on a project being sufficiently 
promising to induce the locality to allocate money toward it and sufficiently worthwhile to 
convince a state board to allocate additional funds.  Note that there is no guarantee that such 
projects actually pay off.  They might crowd out sales in neighboring localities or just fail to 
generate sufficient new visitors to pay for themselves.    
 While our estimate of the project impact is conditional on projects being acceptable to 
both the locality and the state, it is useful to note that the estimator will be holding constant the 
same local fixed effects, past trend growth, and state-wide cyclical factors we are using to set the 
expected county growth in sales.  To see this, suppose that the joint decision ௝ܸ௜ between the state 
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and locality i to fund a project j is based on their expectations regarding ability to pay.  That 
assessment would take the form: 
(5) 	 ௝ܸ௜௧ ൌ 	1	݂݅	߮଴௜ ൅ ߮ଵ௜ݐ ൅ ߮ଶ௜ݐଶ ൅ ߮ெܯ௧ ൐ െ	ߦ௜௝௧ , indicating project approval, and 
 ௝ܸ௜௧ ൌ 	0  otherwise. 
This specification suggests that the approved projects would depend on county-specific fixed 
effects that would control for the local debt and strength of their existing tax base, trend growth 
in the local economy that would affect future ability to fund public goods, and the strength of the 
state economy that would affect the state’s interest in co-funding local projects.  The 
specification in (4) includes the projects that passed the bar defined by (5).  Consequently, the 
coefficients ߙ଴௜, ߙଵ௜, ߙଶ௜, and	ߙெ will control for both the expected growth in county sales in the 
absence of the new public amenities as well as the impact of these same factors on the likelihood 
that an amenity is funded.  Any remaining impact of the local or neighboring community projects 
on county taxable sales will reflect the impact of the unobserved project quality ߦ௜௧	on sales.  
Therefore our conditional estimate of the impact of the Vision Iowa projects will be purged of 
the influence of past county fiscal strength, past trend growth in sales and tax revenue, and state 
macroeconomic shocks.   
 Our results generalize to similar projects that involve the most promising tourism projects 
that would pass both local and state funding reviews.  Only the most promising projects will ever 
be undertaken.  Our estimates will overstate returns to randomly placed and/or designed public 
amenities that do not require local funding or pass a state review, but such projects will never be 
observed in the real world.  
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6. DATA  
We assume that the local authority is the county and that the indicator of amenity success 
or failure will depend on retail sales or the number of firms servicing the retail sector.  In Iowa, 
data on retail sales, ௜ܵ௧, and number of firms by county are available from the Iowa Retail Sales 
and Use Tax Reports, published annually by the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance 
beginning in 1976.  Sales of all taxable goods and services and number of firms are reported in 
total and by two digit merchandise categories as long as five or more businesses within the 
category report data.  Overall taxable retail sales are available for every county and year, and 
data for eating and drinking establishments is available for all but four possible county-year 
cells.    This provides us a comprehensive 32-year window for each county to evaluate whether 
the program has any impact on consumer purchases.  Summary statistics are reported in the 
appendix. 
 The Iowa Department of Economic Development compiled data on every Vision Iowa 
project including local and state contributions, location, and project type and date.9  All 
necessary information on cumulative investments in Vision Iowa projects by county was culled 
from those on-line reports.  We convert the nominal sales data reported by the state to real (2008) 
dollars using the all item urban consumer price index (CPI-U) from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  The resulting state (Vit) and local (Lit) cumulative expenditures on local amenities 
were converted to per capita terms using the county population in 2000.    Our analogously 
computed measure of cumulative per capita amenity expenditures in neighboring counties is 
based on all counties with a common border excluding counties that only touch at the corners.   
 Our control variables include 99 county fixed effects and 99 county-specific trend 
terms.  We also include a squared trend term that we constrain to have a common effect across 
                                                            
9 Project summaries are available at http://www.iowalifechanging.com/documents/documents.aspx?id=27#T  
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the 28 smallest counties with less than 12 thousand population; a common effect across the 56 
intermediate counties with populations between 12 and 50 thousand; and a third common effect 
on the squared trend of the remaining 15 metro counties.10  Our control for the strength of the 
state economy is the annual state unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Finally, research has shown that economic growth is correlated across counties roughly within 
commuting distance of one another (Wheeler 2001; Khan, Orazem, and Otto 2001). To account 
for this, we allow for spatial error dependence by estimating clustered standard errors which 
assume correlation among counties in the same economic region, but no correlation across 
regions11.  In addition, we estimate a double clustering model  to also control for idiosyncratic 
and persistent time specific effects (Thompson 2011). 
7. RESULTS 
 Table 2 reports the results of our estimation of Equation (4) using the natural log of real 
taxable retail sales and of real taxable sales in eating and drinking establishments as the 
dependent variable.  The specification includes 99 county-specific constants, ߙ଴௜, 99 county-
specific linear trends ߙଵ௜, and 3 quadratic trend terms for small, intermediate and large counties.  
These 201 coefficients are estimated but not reported.  The first column is the reduced form 
effect of the state Vision Iowa subsidy on the own county and any potential spillover effects 
from grants awarded to neighboring counties. The focus on only the state subsidy in the own and 
neighboring counties effectively constrains the local expenditure effects ߚ௅ ൌ ߠ௅ ൌ 0.   Because 
the Vision Iowa subsidy requires local effort, the second column separates the Vision Iowa effect 
                                                            
10 Our specification of the quadratic term was based on a preliminary analysis of sales trends by county size.  We 
found that in the years preceding the installation of the Vision Iowa program, the log of real taxable sales declined at 
an increasing rate in the smallest counties and rose at an increasing rate in the largest counjties. 
11 Regions are defined by the BEA’s economic areas, which are designed to encompass regional centers and their 
surrounding counties. The definitions are based on commuting data and newspaper circulation (Partridge et al. 
2006). The t-statistics we report in the tables are cluster-consistent t-statistics or Rogers t-statistics (Primo, 
Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007). 
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into the direct effect of the subsidy plus any indirect effect from induced local expenditures.   
This specification includes the full set of four parameters reflecting responses to cumulative per 
capita state and local expenditures on Vision Iowa projects in the own and neighboring counties.  
The reduced form effects in the first column can be compared to the corresponding summed 
effects of the subsidy and the induced local expenditure in the second column. 
 Turning to the first column, we find that a 1% increase in per capita cumulative state 
Vision Iowa subsidy to the county results in a 0.01% increase in county taxable retail sales. The 
effect is quite large: a 1% increase in per capita subsidy amounts to about $15 thousand spent on 
the local amenity, but the induced increase in taxable sales is nearly $32 thousand per year.  The 
literal implication of this result is that local built amenities are complements with local purchases 
in the retail and hospitality sectors.  The state’s share in the form of a 5% sales tax on induced 
increases in sales is $1,600 per year, implying a state return of 10.7% per year per $15,000 
invested.   
 The state subsidy in any one county does not occur in a vacuum as the state is investing 
in other counties as well.  Investments in neighboring counties may compete with the 
effectiveness of the state subsidy in the own county.  However, it appears that Vision Iowa 
investments are complementary across counties.  Local county sales increase 0.003% from every 
1% increase in per capita subsidies in the neighboring counties.  As a result, even counties that 
did not receive a subsidy benefited from state investments in their neighbors.  These implied 
effects are modest, adding $9,630 in local taxable sales from a 1% increase in public amenities 
located in surrounding communities.  Nevertheless, the key finding is that investments in one 
town do not reduce economic activity in the surrounding towns. 
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 The reason the state gets such a large return on its investment is that it is only investing a 
fraction of the cost of the local project, but with its 5% state sales tax, it gets a disproportionate 
share of any induced return.  In contrast, the local constituents provide over 80% of the cost of 
the project on average but can only charge a maximum sales tax of 2% on the induced increase in 
sales.   
 By including the local expenditure measures lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ and ln൫ܮ௟೔௧൯ as additional regressors, 
we can decompose the reduced form effect of the state subsidy into components attributed to the 
share of the project costs borne by the local entity and the share borne by the state.  The results 
are reported in the second column.  Turning first to the own county effects, the returns to a 1% 
increase in the per capita state subsidy (0.005%) is virtually identical to the return to a 1% 
increase in per capita local expenditure.  This is true despite the fact that a 1% increase in local 
expenditures implies a dollar amount more than 4 times larger than the 1% increase in Vision 
Iowa subsidy.  The key difference is that the local expenditure requires that the community raise 
property taxes to pay for the project.  Presumably, the implied decline in local after tax income 
would reduce sales, even as the project might induce increased sales. In contrast, the state 
subsidy is paid by Casino earnings which have no attached local tax obligation. 
 When we include both lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ and lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ, neither coefficient is statistically significant.  
Because the amount of the local match is tied to the amount of the state award, lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ and 
lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ are highly correlated12, our difficulty in estimating their independent effects is not 
surprising.  Nevertheless, the summed effect of 0.01, interpretable as the elasticity from a 1% 
increase in both local expenditure and state subsidy, is highly significant and virtually identical 
to the reduced form effect of lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ	in the first column.   
                                                            
12 The correlation coefficient between the state contribution lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ and the local match lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ is 0.986.  The 
correlation between these measures in neighboring counties is 0.99.  
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 The summed elasticity of local taxable sales to a 1% increase in state and local Vision 
Iowa expenditures in surrounding counties is 0.003, virtually identical to the estimate in column 
one.  While the individual coefficients are not precisely estimated, their relative magnitudes are 
sensible.  For the spill-in benefits, it is presumably the size of the project that matters most and 
not the funding source as the own county would incur no tax liabilities to fund projects in 
neighboring counties.   
 Overall, the combined effect of a 1% expansion of Vision Iowa funding across the 99 
counties, an investment of just under $1.5 million in local amenities, raised real taxable sales by 
0.013%.  To put that effect in perspective, a 1 point increase in the unemployment rate lowers 
taxable sales by roughly twice that level.   
 The last two columns replicate the exercise except that we focus exclusively on taxable 
sales from eating and drinking establishments.  Here we find that projects in surrounding 
counties compete with own county projects in attracting customers.  Apparently restaurant and 
bar sales are more closely tied to proximity of cultural, recreational and entertainment amenities 
than are retail sales in general.  Nevertheless, the overall effect on taxable eating and drinking 
establishment sales of a 1% increase in state and local per capita Vision Iowa expenditures in 
own and neighboring counties is 0.004%, about one-third of the magnitude for retail sales as a 
whole. 
 The results in Table 2 show significant evidence of spillover benefits from a local built 
amenity to neighboring counties in the form of increased sales and to the state in the form of 
increased sales taxes.  As we only observe completed projects, we cannot test whether the state 
subsidy increases local effort to build public amenities.  However, the existence of these external 
benefits to other jurisdictions as well as to the state implies that the localities would have 
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invested less than the optimum amount on local amenities in the absence of the Vision Iowa 
program.   
 Table 3 shows the corresponding effects of Vision Iowa subsidies and community 
expenditures on the number of firms per capita in the county or in eating and drinking 
establishments. The specification is the same as in Table 1.  In the first column, we find no 
significant effect of the Vision Iowa funds spent locally, but a negative effect of Vision Iowa 
funds spent in the surrounding counties.  While the estimate for neighboring counties is 
statistically significant, it is not large.   This is sensible as the induced increase in taxable sales 
would not be sufficiently large to accommodate even one more firm.   A 1% increase in the 
subsidy in the surrounding counties would lower the number of local firms by less 1 firm.  Thus, 
while the coefficients are significant, the economic importance of the effect is negligible. 
 The balance of the results in Table 3 do not change the story.  Local investments in public 
amenities have a significant but very small impact on the number of local firms while 
investments in surrounding communities have small negative effects on the number of local 
firms.  The summed effect of Vision Iowa investments in the local and surrounding communities 
would have a net negative effect that implies less than one lost firm per 1% increase in 
investment.  Consequently, this program had negligible effects on firm entry and exit.  The 
increase in sales we found from Vision Iowa investments in Table 1 came virtually entirely from 
expanding sales in preexisting firms. 
An additional issue is whether local amenities have larger effects in larger cities relative 
to small towns.  Our measure of amenity investment is in per capita terms, but if there are scale 
effects we would find larger impacts in urban than rural areas. We include a term that interacts 
the Vision Iowa infusion in the own and neighboring counties (ln(Vit) and ln(Vlt)) with an urban 
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dummy variable.   These results are presented in Table 4.  The own county impact of Vision 
Iowa investments are not significantly different for rural and urban counties; however, the 
spillovers are different.  Investments made in urban counties have relatively large, positive 
spillovers to neighboring counties’ retail sales and no impact on the neighboring number of 
firms.  The benefits of amenity investments in rural counties come in part by poaching sales and 
firms from their neighbors. 
 To illustrate the magnitude of these effects, we report the implied impact of a one dollar 
per capita infusion in Vision Iowa subsidy or local expenditure match in the local county or in 
the surrounding counties.  A one dollar per capita increase corresponds to a $29,014 in aggregate 
expenditure when we apply the average county population over the sample period.  These results, 
based on simulations of the second and fourth columns of Tables 2 and 3, are reported in Table 
4. 
First, looking at the effects on total sales, we can see that a $1 per capita infusion of 
Vision Iowa grant results in an annual increase of total taxable sales of $37,246.  This is not the 
full effect as the infusion requires a local match.  The effect of $1 per capita of Vision Iowa 
subsidy plus a $1 per capita local match rises to $45,044 in increased sales per year.  Similar 
investments are occurring in other counties that could complement or compete with local sales.  
When we add an additional dollar per capita in Vision Iowa subsidy and $1 local match in the 
surrounding counties, we find that local sales rise by $43,896.   
Is this a good deal for the state?   The best measure of the state’s return is ௜ܸ௧ ൅ 4 ∗ ܮ௜௧ 
from an infusion of $1 of state Vision Iowa subsidy per capita.  The rationale is that each $1 of 
state investment generated an average of $4 of local investment.  From the state’s perspective, 
the infusion of $29,014 yields an increase in annual taxable sales of $37,246 + 4*$7,798 = 
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$68,438 per year.13  The state sales tax is 5% of this or $3,422 per year.  The internal rate of 
return for the state is 0.118.  The general equilibrium effects make this a lower-bound estimate of 
the return, as the Vision Iowa subsidy in one county increases sales modestly in surrounding 
counties as well.  In comparison, the 10-year rate of return on the state’s pension program from 
2002 to 2012 was 0.073314. 
Is this a good deal for the locality?  The local cost is $116,056 to generate the annual 
increase in local sales of $68,438.  The local sales tax is 2%, so the induced local sales tax 
revenue is $1,369 per year.  The internal rate of return is 0.012 or roughly one-tenth the return 
that goes to the state.  However, the local area also gets the value of consuming the new local 
amenity, and so the true local return must be larger than 0.012. 
It is apparent that the state has a substantial interest in encouraging the development of 
these local cultural, recreational and entertainment amenities.  Just through the induced sales tax 
revenue, the state makes back a good return on its investment.  The return to the local 
community is much more modest.  Because some of the return is externalized and because the 
local government’s return is quite modest even with the subsidy, it seems apparent that the local 
communities would undersupply these amenities without the state subsidy. 
For completeness, we include the related impacts on total firm numbers and on the eating 
and drinking sector from dollar per capita investments by source and location.  Note that if we 
continue to apply the 4 to 1 average local match required by the program, the implied total effect 
of a dollar per capita Vision Iowa infusion on total firm numbers is -0.038 + 4*0.014 = 0.02 local 
firms added to the local market.  On net, the Vision Iowa project as implemented has a small 
                                                            
13 This is an underestimate because neighboring counties would have modest increases in taxable sales also. 
14 http://www.ipers.org/publications/misc/pdf/financial/cafr/cafr.pdf  
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positive effect on firm numbers.  The general equilibrium effects on other counties go in the 
opposite direction, so even this modest change in firm numbers is an overestimate.   
The impacts on eating and drinking establishments show that the benefits of the program 
are more broadly felt than just the food service sector.  The total sales effect is a factor of ten 
larger than that on restaurants and bars.  As with overall firm numbers, there is only a negligible 
effect on the number of eating and drinking establishments. 
8. CONCLUSIONS  
 For eight years, the State of Iowa offered local areas the possibility of getting a subsidy 
for approved local built amenities.  The Vision Iowa program resulted in 393 new publicly 
funded local amenities aimed at attracting visitors to the locales.  Our analysis indicates that on 
average, the amenities increased county taxable retail sales relative to the county’s past trend 
sales growth by 0.01% for every 1% growth in expenditures on local amenities.  These built 
amenities also had spillover benefits to neighboring communities in the form of smaller induced 
growth in taxable sales.  In addition, because the state taxes each dollar of added sales by 5%, the 
state receives benefits from the program as well.  Viewed as an investment, the State’s 
expenditures on the Vision Iowa program generated an average return of 11.8% per year in 
increased sales tax revenues.  The return to the local government’s investment was smaller, both 
because the local sales tax was limited to 2% of taxable sales and because the local share of 
expenses averaged 4 times the state share.  Nevertheless, the local government still garnered a 
positive tax return at 1.2% per year per dollar invested along with the hedonic benefits from the 
local public good. 
 Our finding of large conditional returns to local public amenity projects suggests that 
there may be a value to the selection process itself, above and beyond the allocation of funds for 
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local projects.  A commonly prescribed solution for local under-provision of public goods is to 
institute revenue sharing or block grants whereby the state issues funds to each locality in 
proportion to its population.  However, there is no reason to believe that an equal distribution of 
funds per capita will be allocatively efficient: equalizing marginal benefit per dollar expended.  
Our results suggest that in the context of local amenities aimed at tourism, it may be more 
advisable to make central allocations conditional on the apparent viability of the project 
proposal.  In that way, only the best projects with the largest apparent spillover benefits get 
funded.  As an example, public research funds are commonly allocated by competitive grants 
going to the best researchers or the most credible proposals rather than by equal distributions 
allocated to the entire population of potential researchers. In the case of cultural, recreational or 
entertainment projects aimed at attracting visitors, the joint selection of the most promising 
projects by the locality and the state may be a critical element of the program’s success.  
 As for the concept of fiscal federalism, our results show why left to themselves, local 
areas will underinvest in public amenities aimed at attracting tourists.  Because benefits spillover 
to other communities and to the state as a whole, the subsidy from the state is necessary to 
induce local communities to provide the efficient level of the local public good.  Hence, built 
local amenities aimed at attracting visitors are a case where fiscal federalism improves local 
provision of public goods. 
People will come Ray. 
They'll come to Iowa for reasons they can't even fathom. 
Terrance Mann to Ray Kinsella Field of Dreams (1989) 
 In the case of Vision Iowa projects, they did come, as Karin Kinsella and Terrance Mann 
predicted.  But they only come if the amenity is built.  The spillover benefits to other 
jurisdictions mean that local tourist amenities may, without the state subsidy, remain just a vision 
or a dream.  
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Table 1: Distribution of Vision Iowa Projects and Funds   
    
 Number of 
Projects 
% of Total Amount of 
Funds 
(in millions) 
% of Total 
Total Projects 357  $368.41  
Projects in Casino Counties 81 22.69% $233.24 63.3%
     
Number of Projects By Project Type     
Cultural 122 34.17% $119.80 32.5%
Recreational/Outdoor 201 56.30% $95.82 26.0%
Entertainment 34 9.52% $152.79 41.5%
     
Project in County By Population     
Population under 10,000 275 77.03% $75.98 20.6%
Population between 10,000 and 
50,000 
37 10.36% $57.14 
15.5%
Population over 50,000 45 12.61% $235.29 63.9%
  
25 
 
Table 2: Regressions of the Log of Real County Taxable Sales on Cumulative Vision 
Iowa Expenditures per Capita 
 
Total Sales 
Eating and Drinking 
Establishment Sales 
Own County      
lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ 0.010*** 0.005 0.008*** 0.005 
 (3.82) (1.60 ) (3.23) (1.39) 
lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ ---- 0.005 ---- 0.003 
  (1.11)  (0.71) 
Surrounding Counties     
ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ 0.003 -0.004 -0.004** 0.013 
 (1.30) (0.318) (2.25) (0.71) 
ln൫ܮ௟೔௧൯ ---- 0.007 ---- -0.015 
  (0.34)  (0.89) 
Mt -0.027*** 
(4.63) 
-0.027*** 
(4.63) 
-0.016*** 
(4.63) 
-0.016*** 
(4.62) 
     
N 3267 3267  3266 3266 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Marginal R2  0.06  0.03 
Summed Effects     
     
lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ ൅ lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ  0.010***  0.008*** 
  (4.10)  (3.31) 
ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ ൅ ln൫ܮ௟೔௧൯  0.003  -0.003 
  (0.76)  (1.38) 
lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ ൅	 lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ൅	ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ ൅ ln൫ܮ௟೔௧൯ 0.013***  0.005** 
  (4.59)  (2.47) 
 
County Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
County-specific trends √ √ √ √ 
County group squared trend √ √ √ √ 
Note: Cluster-consistent t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance: ∗ significant at 
the 10-percent level; ∗∗ significant at the 5-percent level; ∗∗∗ significant at the 1-percent level. 
The R2 is artificially inflated by the fact that the county-specific trends and dummy variables alone can 
explain 98% of the variance in log real taxable sales across counties and time.  The marginal R2 is the 
fraction of the variance of the demeaned and detrended dependent variable that can be explained by the 
model.    
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Table 3: Regressions of the Log of Firm Numbers on Cumulative Vision Iowa               
Expenditures per Capita 
 
Total Firms 
Eating and Drinking 
Establishments 
Own County      
lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ 0.001 -0.002 0.006*** -0.004 
 (0.51) (0.92) (3.39) (-1.38) 
lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ ---- 0.003** ---- 0.009*** 
  (2.03)  (3.34) 
Surrounding Counties     
ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ -0.009*** 0.008 -0.010*** -0.010 
 (3.82) (0.63) (5.64) (0.68) 
ln൫ܮ௟೔௧൯ ---- -0.015 ---- -0.003 
  (1.32)  (0.02) 
Mt 0.009*** 
(2.93) 
0.010*** 
(2.93) 
0.014*** 
(5.14) 
0.014*** 
(5.15) 
     
N  3267 3267 3263 3263 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 
Marginal R2  0.07  0.04 
Summed Effects  
lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ ൅ lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ 0.001  0.005*** 
 (0.51)  (2.91) 
ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ ൅ ln൫ܮ௟೔௧൯ -0.008***  -0.010*** 
 (3.42)  (4.25) 
lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ ൅	 lnሺܮ௜௧ሻ൅	ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ ൅ ln൫ܮ௟೔௧൯ -0.007***  -0.005*** 
 (5.18)  (3.31) 
  
County Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
County-specific linear trend √ √ √ √ 
County group squared trend √ √ √ √ 
Note: Cluster-consistent t-statistics in parentheses.  ∗ significant at the 10-percent level; ∗∗ significant at 
the 5-percent level; ∗∗∗ significant at the 1-percent level 
The R2 is artificially inflated by the fact that the county-specific trends and dummy variables alone can 
explain 98% of the variance in log real taxable sales across counties and time.  The marginal R2 is the 
fraction of the variance of the demeaned and detrended dependent variable that can be explained by the 
model.   
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Table 4: Regressions of the Log of Real County Taxable Sales on Cumulative Vision Iowa 
Expenditures per Capita for Rural and Urban Counties 
 
Total Sales 
Eating and 
Drinking 
Establishment 
Sales Total Firms 
Eating and 
Drinking Firms 
Own County      
lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ 0.007*** 0.005*** -0.001 0.004*** 
 (6.01) (2.83 ) (0.38) (2.64) 
lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻݔ	ݑݎܾܽ݊ 
-0.004 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.79) (0.63) (0.20) (0.47) 
Surrounding Counties     
ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ 0.002 -0.005*** -0.010** -0.011*** 
 (1.23) (4.23) (10.45) (9.23) 
ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ ݔ	ݑݎܾܽ݊ 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.009** 0.013*** 
 (4.01) (3.52) (3.54) (4.33) 
N 3267 3266  3267 3263 
R2 0.56 0.31 0.49 0.27 
Summed Effects     
lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻ ൅ lnሺ ௜ܸ௧ሻݔ	ݑݎܾܽ݊ 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.002 
 (0.55) (0.76) (0.03) (0.88) 
ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ ൅ ln൫ ௟ܸ೔௧൯ ݔ	ݑݎܾܽ݊ 0.028*** 0.016*** -0.001 0.003 
 (4.20) (2.66) (0.24) (0.90) 
     
County Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
County-specific trends √ √ √ √ 
County group squared trend √ √ √ √ 
Note: Cluster‐consistent t‐statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance: ∗ significant at the 10‐
percent level; ∗∗ significant at the 5‐percent level; ∗∗∗ significant at the 1‐percent level.
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Table 5: Implied Real Returns from a One Dollar per Capita Vision Iowa Subsidy or Expenditurea 
 Change in ….  Change in …. 
Dollar Change per Capita Total Sales Dollar Change per Capita Eating and Drinking 
Sales 
Vit $37,246 Vit $2,964 
Lit $7,798 Lit $479 
௟ܸ೔௧ -$2,161 ௟ܸ೔௧ $580 
ܮ௟೔௧ $1,012 ܮ௟೔௧ -$195 
Vit + Lit $45,044 Vit + Lit $3443 
௟ܸ೔௧ ൅ ܮ௟೔௧	 -$1,148 ௟ܸ೔௧ ൅ ܮ௟೔௧  $385 
Vit + Lit + ௟ܸ೔௧ ൅ ܮ௟೔௧ $43,896 Vit + Lit + ௟ܸ೔௧ ൅ ܮ௟೔௧ $3,827 
    
Dollar Change per Capita 
Total Firms 
Dollar Change per Capita Eating and Drinking 
Firms 
Vit -0.038 Vit -0.007 
Lit 0.014 Lit -0.004 
௟ܸ೔௧ 0.011 ௟ܸ೔௧ 0.001 
ܮ௟೔௧ -0.006 ܮ௟೔௧ 0.000 
Vit + Lit -0.024 Vit + Lit -0.011 
௟ܸ೔௧ ൅ ܮ௟೔௧	 0.005 ௟ܸ೔௧ ൅ ܮ௟೔௧  -0.001 
Vit + Lit + ௟ܸ೔௧ ൅ ܮ௟೔௧ -0.020 Vit + Lit + ௟ܸ೔௧ ൅ ܮ௟೔௧ -0.010 
aA one dollar increase per capita corresponds to a $29,014 expenditure on average. 
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Appendix table A1.  Summary Statistics and Data Sources for Variables 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Data Source 
Total Retail Sales ($millions) 3,263 2,036.9 5,295.8 111.0 65,716.1 IA Dept. of Revenue 
Eating and Drinking 
Establishment Sales ($millions) 3,266 18.3 45.8 0.60 655.2 IA Dept. of Revenue 
Total Retail Firms 3,267 868.4 1,081.9 159.0 10,124.0 IA Dept. of Revenue 
Total Eating and Drinking Firms 3,267 68.1 95.1 8.0 962.3 IA Dept. of Revenue 
Unemployment rate 3,267 4.68 1.54 2.70 8.40 
IA Workforce 
Development 
 
 
